Huntingdon Life Sciences PLC - Court of Appeal upholds indefinite ASBO's against animal rights activists

Michael Bowes QC and Jodie Mittell appeared for the Respondent.

The appellants (G, N, H and M) each appealed against an indefinite antisocial behaviour order (ASBO) imposed alongside varying periods of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit blackmail. The appellants had created a website for the sole purpose of forcing a research organisation that was licensed to test on animals to cease business. On the website they published contact details of companies and individuals that were associated with the organisation. Consequently the individuals became the target of threats, violence, hoax bombs, abuse, disruption and their properties were damaged. There were also grave financial consequences for the companies. The judge had been minded to impose sentences of imprisonment for public protection on G, N and H, but did not have the power to do so. G and N had pleaded guilty to the offence and were sentenced to nine years' imprisonment; M and H were convicted following trial and sentenced to eight and eleven years' imprisonment respectively. There were a number of co-accused; two received shorter sentences and three were made subject to ASBOs for five years. The judge found G and N to be lifelong fanatical activists and the main organisers, whereas he stated that M was fuelled by his own self worth and admiration of others. M was almost blind. The appellants submitted that (1) it was unnecessary to make them subject to ASBOs and that they should not have been indefinite; (2) the prohibitions in the first paragraph of the ASBO, which stated that they were "not knowingly to participate in, organise or control any demonstration, meeting, gathering or website protesting against animal experiment", were a disproportionate interference with their right to participate in political debate and they relied on the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 art.10 and art.11 ; (3) M was in a different situation than the rest of them and therefore his ASBO was particularly disproportionate.

Medd-Hall's appeal allowed, other appeals dismissed. (1) The judge was well placed to assess the gravity and need for public protection. It was important to note that the appellants showed no remorse and that G and N had pleaded on pragmatic grounds. The judge did not believe that the acts would cease on release and the likelihood of them behaving was slight. If they did have a genuine change of heart then they could apply to quash the order. The judge was entitled to impose indefinite ASBOs. It was true that a number of authorities indicated that there were circumstances where a separate ASBO was not necessary where custody had been imposed, as conditions could be attached to a licence to provide public protection, but that was not a universal principle and the judge had to make an assessment in the particular circumstances, R. v W [2006] EWCA Crim 686, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 339 considered. The judge had to make an assessment at the time and he did not consider that licence conditions would protect the public. (2) Freedom of speech and right of assembly were very important rights and it was severe to limit them, but the instant circumstances were exceptional. The first paragraph of the ASBO was necessary and was not covered by the rest of the order. It was not unclear and the appellants could come back to the court for clarification if necessary. (3) M really was in a different category to the other appellants. Based on the judge's comments relating to M it was not necessary to impose a lifelong order on him. The ASBO was reduced to a five-year period from the date of M's release.